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COVERED INTEREST PARITY, UNCOVERFD INTEREST 
PARITY, AND EXCHANGE RATE DYNAMICS* 
ABSTR.l\.CT 
A nur.:.ber of nacroeconomic models of open economies under 
flexible exchange rate assUJI1e a strong version of perfect capital 
mobi 1 i ty \,hich ir.,plies that currency speculation coranands no risk 
pre:niur;i. If this assumption is dropped a m..1J-;iber of important 
results no longer obtain. First, the exchange rate and interest rate 
cannot be in steady state unless both the government deficit and 
current account equal zero, not sir.iply their slilTI. Second, even in 
steady state the domestic interest rate can deviate from the foreign 
interest rate by an amount that depends upon relative domestic asset 
. 
supplies. Finally, introducing risk aversion on the part of speculators 
reduces the response on impact of the exchange rate to changes in domestic 
asset supplies. In this sense rational speculators, if they are less 
risk averse than other agents, can a.estahilize exchange r.iarkets. 
* 
He wish to thank Gene M. Grossman for some helpful comments on this 
paper. 
\ 
I. INTRODUCTION A.i\JD su~~1.\RY 
The advent of floating rates among the major currencies has led to 
the development of increasingly sophisticated models of open economies in 
which exchange rates are market determined. As was pointed out in the early 
work of Fleming (1962) and Mundell (1963) the degree of international capital 
mobility is crucial in determining the response of an economy to both monetary 
and fiscal actions. And while the Fleming-Mundell analysis is based on the 
traditional static short-run model, the i~portance of the degree of capital 
Dobility applies to the long-run response as well. 
Perhaps because capital does seem to be very mobile among the major 
industrial countries, the polar assumption of perfect capital mobility has 
received most attention. This assumption may be interpreted in two different 
ways, however. The first, weaker version is that bonds which are free of 
default risk domestically are also free of default risk abroad; in Aliber's 
(1973) tenninology, there is no 'political' risk. When capital mobility of 
this degree obtains, foreign bonds on which forward cover has been obtained 
are perfect substitutes for domestic bonds and arbitrage brings the domestic 
interest rate (R) into equality with the foreign interest rate (R*) plus the 
fon,ard premium on foreign exchange (F). Thus coverec interest parity (CIP) 
obtains 
R = R* + F (1.1) 
\-.'here R, R* and F are defined over the same time interval. In fact, empirical 
evidence suggests that among the major industrial nations, deviations from CIP 
are not significant; see e.g. Aliber (1973), Frenkel and Levich (1975, 1977). 
A stronger definition of capital mobility is one that adds to the 
cri tcrion for the first the requirement that attib..nes ~m,·ards exchange risk be 
characterized by risk neutrality, either because thereqexist a sufficient 
number of risk neutral speculators, or because exchange risk is perfectly 
ondiversifiabfc. In this case, speculation will bring the fon.. ar<l premium 
foreign exchange into equality with the expected rate of appreciation of the 
foreign currency; that is 
• C
F = (E/E) (1. 2) 
where E denotes the price of foreign currency in terms of domestic cu
rrency, 
and where for any variable X, we define X=dX/dt and Xe denotes the 
expectation of X. Substituting (1.2) into (1.1) yields the condition
 
(1.3) 
a condition "·hi ch is referred to as uncovered interest parity (UIP) a
nd 
which requires both (1. 1) and (1. 2) to hold. 
1 
Hm,ever, the empirical evidence in support of (1. 2) is not as strong 
Levich (1978, Bilson (1978) and Hansen and Hodrick (1980)as it is for (1.1). 
report so::-,e syster.iatic deYiations for several exchange rates over lon
g periods. 
These findings are consistent with financial models of foreign investm
ent 
which suggest that risk aversion among rational, fully informed specu
lators \\·i 11 
Solnik (1973),create a risk premium, thereby causing (1.2) to break dmm. 
Frankel (1979) and Eaton and TurnovskyKouri (1976), Adler and Dumas (1977) 1 
(1980) deriye various expressions for this premium based on ex--pected 
utility 
maximization. 
But despite the lack of theoretical justification for UIP and the 
empirical evidence against it, most well-known results about the beha
viour 
of macroeconomic models with perfectly mobile capital require this st
ronger 
definition to apply. This paper develops a model of a small open eco
nomy 
under the more general assumption that the fon~ard pre~ium on foreign
 exchange 
Capital is stillis detere.ine<l by risk averse speculative behaviour. 
perfectly r.:iobile in the weaker sense that CIP obtains and a special c
ase of 
our nodel is one in which the degree of risk aversion tends to zero, 
in which 
We use this model to examine several propositionscase UIP applies as well. 
about the bchJviour of a small open economy with a flexible exchange 
rate. 
These pertain to: the effects of changes in domestic asset supplies 
and 
foreign interest rate on the steady-state levels of the domestic inte
rest 
rate and exchange rate; the effects of ongoing government deficits; 
and the 
dynamic behaviour of the exchange rate between steady states. 
In Section 2 which follo\-.'S, we develop a dynamic model of an open 
economy in 1-.-liich the exchange rate, interest rate, and foTh·ard premium
 arc 
.) . 
detennined at each instant by money market and forward market equilibrium 
At any moment, the price of nontradedconditions, together with CIP. 
goods and asset supplies are predetermined, while we treat the foreign interest 
rate and price level as exogenous. Over time, the price of nontraded 
goods adjusts gradually to the price of traded goods; the supplies of 
domestic assets change through the government deficit, ¼"hile the balance of 
payments on current account detennines the change in foreign asset supplies. 
With risk averse speculative behaviour, exchange rate and price dynamics 
on the one hand, become inherently linked with asset supply dyna!ilics on the 
other. For the syste;n as a whole, and the exchange rate and interest rate 
in particular, to be in steady state, all asset accumulation must cease and 
for this to occur, both the budget deficit cmd the balance of payments on 
current account must equal zero. 
In the limiting case in which speculators are risk neutral, the 
conditions for the exchange rate and price level to attain steady state may 
be relaxed. For example, with a bond-financed governr:ient deficit, it is 
necessary only for the budget deficit and current account surplus to swn to 
zero. Thus the exchange rate and price level can be in steady state even 
if the government deficit is perpetually unbalanced, as long as it is offset 
by an appropriate imbalance on the current account, If, in addition, asset 
supplies do not affect the demand for money, the exchange rate and the price 
level evolve independently of the government deficit and the balance of 
payments on current account. In this case, the exchange rate and price level car 
be in steady state even if these t,rn quantities do not sum to zero. 
2 
These observations are of relevance to a number of recent studies of 
exchange rate dynamics (e.g. Dornbusch (1976), Gray and Turnovsky (1979a), 
and \\'i Ison (1979)) who specify models of exchange rate and price dynamics 
in which do_mestic and foreign bond supplies play no explicit role. This 
exclusion ·is legitimate only under the c~rong assumption of UIP (an assumption 
al 1 these authors lilake). Furthermore, ~ell's (1963) finding 
that under flexible rates a government _Ci_ will not disturb the steady 
4. 
state exchange rate or interest rate (because its effect on the total bond 
supply is offset by the current account) also requires UIP to hold. 
In Section 3 we examine the properties of the steady state itself. 
An important aspect of the income detennination models of Mundell (1963) 
and Fleming (1962) and of the exchange rate dynamics of Dornbusch (1976) 
et al. is that,in steady state, the domestic interest rate equals the 
foreign interest rate and is independent of domestic asset supplies. 3 In 
addition, the steady-state exchange rate and domestic price level are 
homogeneous of degree one in the domestic money supply. None of these 
results is preserved v;hen speculators are risk averse. Thus, even if CIP 
obtains, the domestic interest rate can be affected by domestic policies 
in steady state, so;:;ething that is not possibleu:.der UIP. Also, the 
exchange rate and douestic price level are homogeneous of degree one, and 
the interest rate homogeneous of degree zero, in the supplies of both domestic 
assets taken together, and not just money. 4 
Sections 4 and 5 exar.iine the transition between steady states, a 
subject "'·hich has been receiving extensive treatment recently. In Section 
4 we show that once-and-for-all proportional increases in the supplies of 
money and domestic bonds introduced simultaneously can, on impact, cause 
either a s~aller than, or greater than; proportional response in the exchange 
rate. This result contrasts with the previous models in ~hich,under similar 
assumptions but with UIP ~olding, the exchange rate necessarily 'overshoots' 
its steady state value. 5 The change in the exchange rate on impact varies 
inversely with the degree of risk aversion. Our model thus suggests a sense 
in which speculation (or more properly, less risk averse speculation) destc:OiZ-:za 
exchange rates; this is in the sense of increa ·ng their short-run 
sensitivity to changes in domestic asset supplies. 
In Section 5 \•:e consider the dynamic effects of once-and-for-z -.:rngc.s 
lTI t!. :sey supply alone. Since this type of change affects the nw;. of 
fore i, :ids held in steady state, the dynamics are considerably mor. 
complicatcc.l, hith asset accumulation playing a more central role. 
s. 
2. A DY};Af!IC MACRO MODEL 
We consider a small open economy in which private agents may 
hold as assets domestic money, domestic bonds, and foreign bonds, all of 
-..hich, "We assume, they regard as components of their net weal th. The first 
two assets are denominated in· domestic currency, and the third in 
foreign currency. Thus, at any moment, nrivate nominal weal th W 
is given by 
(2.1) 
"·here M denotes the supply of domestic money (Khich we assume is held only 
domestically), Ad th~ number of domestic bonds held domestically, Bd the 
number of foreign bonds held domestically, Eis the spot rate measured 
as the price of a unit of foreign exchange in tenns of domestic currency. 
We assume that there is no perceived risk of default on domestic or 
foreign bonds so that CIP obtains 
R = R* + F, (2.2) 
Since our analysis is in continuous time, F measures the 
instantaneous rate of fon~ard premium on foreign exchange and is defined 
formally by 
Ef(t,t+h) - E(t)l (2. 3)F(t) =lim [ hE (t) 
h-+O 
where Ef (t, t+h) is the price at time t of one unit of foreign exchange in 
period t+h. Since as the time unit h-+O, the spot and fan-Jard rates must 
converge, E(t) = Ef(t, t), in which case the limit in (2.3) may be expressed 
by the following partial derivative 
f fF(t) = E (t, t)/E (t, t).2 
Since domestic and covered foreign bonds are perfect subs ti tutes we 
shall assume that all domestic bonds are held domestically. Thus we let 
Ad= A, where A denotes the total supply of domestic bonds. We allow Bd to 
assume negative values "When domestic agents issue liabilities denominated 
in foreign currency. 
Individuals consume both traded and nontraded goods, which are 
imperfect substitutes. Perfect goods arbitrage ensures that the prices 
of traded goods are detemined by the law of one price. We assume that 
because of long tenn contracts, the prices of nontraded goods at any 
instant are fixed at P, say. An index of the domestic cost of 
living C is therefore 
0 < o < 1 (2.4) 
where o denotes the share of nontraded goods in consumption and P* is 
the exogenously given foreign price level (i.e. the foreign price of traded 
goods). For notational siraplici ty we set P* = 1. 
We assu::ne a del:land for money function of the fonn 
M -C - L(Y, R, H) ½ > 0, L < 0, (2. 5)R = 
Khere Y is real income,assumed to be fixed, and H = W/C denotes real wealth. 
Note that we have deflated by C, reflecting the fact that real wealth 
depends upon the price of both traded and nontraded goods in accordance 
with their shares in consumption. 
Together, equations (2.1), (2,2), (2.4) and (2.5) determine, at any 
moment, equilibrium values of C, R, F, and Was functions of P, E, A, Bd, M, 
and the exogenous foreign variables R* and P*. 
he noh· turn to the d)11a..r.iic eouations of the system. First, consider 
fon,·ard market equilibrium. Participation in the fon;ard market may be for 
two reasons, speculation and arb{trage. 6 We assume that the real demand 
for speculative foreign exchange fon-.,ard, denoted by J , is an increasing 
function of the expected rate of return on speculation, given by the difference 
bcthcen the expected rate of depreciation of the domestic currency (t/E)e and 
the fon~ard premium F. We shall assume expectations are realized on average. 
Since he suppress stochastic elements in our model this is equivalent to 
· e • 7assuming perfect foresight, so that (E/E) = E/E. Fon--ard market equi 1i bri uJJ 
requires that J equal the supply of foreign exchange forward for arbitrage; 
i.e., that ,,hi ch 1s sold to cover domestic holdings of foreign hands: 
J::;I.) J::; (2 .6)= J (- - F) J' > o.c E = 
As shoKn by previous authors, J embodies attitudes to risk taking. In 
particular, J' varies inversely with the degree of risk aversion, with 
J' ➔ in the limiting case of risk neutrality, when DIP obtains.00 
By appropriate choice of units, the steady-state price of nontraded 
goods can be equated to the dor:1estic price of traded goods. We assume 
that the price of nontraded goods is determined by long tenn contracts, 
so that the nontraded goods price cannot jump instantaneously to its 
equilibrilliil level, but can adjust only continuously over time, as contracts 
expire. This adjustment is specified by the relationship 
P = G(E/P) G' > 0, G(l) = 0, (2. 7; 
The rate of change in the supply of domestic assets is determined 
by the goveI11J11ent budget constraint 
. . (2. s:M +A= PGd + EGm - T + RA - g 
where Gd and Gm represent real government expenditures on nontraded and 
traded goods respectively, and T denotes nominal tax revenues. The rate of 
change in the domestic holdings of foreign assets is equal to the balance 
of payments on current account 
EBd = EX(.) - EG
m 
+ R*EBd =b 
where X(.) denotes real net exports of the private sector. 
Together with an assumption about how the government finances its 
expenditures, equations (2.6), (2. 7), (2,8) and (2.9) determine the evolution 
of E, P, A, M, and Bd. From the description of the system it might appear 
that the spot rate Eis constrained always to move continuously. This is 
not so. Because of the assumption of perfect foresight embodied in (2.6), 
the dynamics will generally involve (at least) one unstable root. Following 
the rational expectations methodology, this root may be elir:1inated by allo~ing ti 
exchange: rate to undergo an endogenously determined initial jur:1p at points 
where the system is subject to an exogenous disturbance. Simple examplc5 of 
this are: river, in Sccti0ns --1 anc.l S he low. 
Define total nominal bond holdings Bas 
Adding (2.8) and (2.9) and using the CIP condition (2.2), we obtain 
M + B = PG - T +EX+ RB+ (t/E - F)EBd. (2.lC
d 
From this equation it is evident that in general the evolution of the system 
depends upon the breakdown of B between domestic and foreign bonds. Thus, 
for e.\ample, if M = O (the deficit is bond-financed), E, P and B cannot assume 
their steady state values unless B·d =A= O; that is,unless both the government 
deficit (g) and the balance of payments on current account (b) are zero. 
And the s~~e applies in the case of money financing. 
Consider, hoh'c\·er, the liniting case in which J' (.) ➔ 00 , i.e. the 
speculati ,.-c de;:iand for foreign exchange forward becomes infinitely elastic. 
In order for the speculative demand to remain bounded, (1.2) must hold. 
In this case (2.2) and (2.6) reduce to the UIP condition (1.3), so that (2.10) 
becomes 
M + B = PGd - T +EX+ RB. (2.10 
\\'riting (2.1) as 
H = (M + B)/C (2.1 
equations (2,1'), (2.4), (1,3), (2,5), (2,7), (2,10') constitute a dynamic 
system in \,·hich A and Bd do not appear (assuming of course that A and Bd do 
not enter separately in the specifications of Gd, Gm' T, or X). If the 
government deficit is bond-financed M = O. The dynamics de;,end only upon 
the sur' of the government deficit and the current account deficit (g + b) 
and not the separate components, Steady state now only requires that 
B = E = P = 0. The government may sustain a deficit in steady state as lon6 
as it is offset by a current account deficit of equal size, since the steady 
• . ·d 
state requirement B = 0 is equivalent to A= -EB . With money financing, 
both co~poncnts must be zero. 
A special case widely adopted in the literature, and therefore of 
importance, arises if the demand for mon~- ; assumed to be independent of real 
weal th II. Consider first the limiting a~ :ion of infinitely elastic 
9. 
speculative- b;:..lances. If the government deficit is bond-financed, the 
dynarai cs of P and E become independent of g + b and these variables can attai
n 
steady-state cqui librium with· i-·eal th, in the form of bonds, being accumulated
 
indefinitely. 8 With a money-financed deficit, steady state for E and 
P requires 
only that the governr..ent deficit be zero; the current account balance can be
 
non-zero, with domestic residents continually accumulating (or decumulating) 
In the general case \\here J • is finite, no variable can be inforeign bonds. 
steady state unless g=b=O. However, u.."'lder bond financing E and P can attain s
tead; 
state with only b = 0, provided one imposes the additional.restriction 
that net exports be independent of H. 
9 
In formulating dyna,:;ic reacro models such as the one above, it is citen 
Thus, if oneconvc:-iient to specify real savings behaviour directly. 
postulat12s 
(2 .11H = S(.) 
it follo~s froc (2.1), (2,8), and (2.11) that the rate of net capital inflow 
E~d can be derived as 
. d· 
+ T - RA. (2.12= CS(.) + W[cSP/P + (1-6)E/E] - BE - [PGd + EGm] 
By co~paring (2.9) and (2.12) it is clear that S(.) and X(.) cannot be 
specifie2 independently. 
These obser,ations about the appropriate specification of dynamic 
mcdels under perfect capital mobility have important implications for various
 
models appearing in the literature. First, the model of exchange 
rate 
dynamics introd\..iced ty Dornbusch (1976) and studied by other authors ignores 
the balance of pay,,!ents and savings behaviour in analyzing the dynamics of th
e 
exchange rate. This is possible only because they assume UIP and that there 
arc no asset supply effects on money dc'.lland, Under the less restrictive 




one hand,and asset accu.'11Ulation,on the other,are jointly det
ermined, even 
in the absence of wealth effects in the demand for money. 
a well known result of ~~ndell (1968) is that a governmentSecond, 
deficit has no effect on the steady state of a small open ec
onomy under 
conditions of perfect capital mobility and flexible exchange
 rates. This 
is certainly true under the conditions of UIP when any chang
e in the deficit 
will be offset by a change in the current account deficit, l
eaving the 
system unchanged. However, it is not generally true under C
IP, when indeed 
steady state requires 1:he deficit to be zero. 
3. STEADY -STATE PROPERTIES 
t-lodels of exchange rate detennination based on the assumptio
n of UIP 
and the absence of an ongoing inflation yield the following s
teady-state 
relationship 
(3.1R = R* 
where - is used to denote the steady-state value of a variab
le. Thus the 
domestic interest rate is completely tied to the world rate,
 from which we 
immediately infer: 
(i) Changes in the foreign interest rate yield equal 
changes in the domestic interest rate; 
(ii) the da□ cstic interest rate is independent of the suppl
y 
of do~estic money or domestic bonds. 
Other steady-state properties depend upon the policy specifi
cation 
and the dynamic system so generated. If one adopts the freq
uently postulated 
. f . , ()savings unction-~ 
(3.2S = ¢(H(Y, R*) - !-l) 
where ll is some long-TUn dcsiTed level of real wealth, the steady-sta
te 
monetary cquilibriuD rclations~ip bccc~cs 
M LrY n* jl(V• , R*-))·• (3.2E - l ' I\ ' • 
From this equation, two further propositions foll01-,: 
11. 
(iii) A given change in the domestic money supply leads 
to a proportionate change in the exchange rate; 
(iv) the exchange rate is independent of the supply of 
domestic bonds. 
None of properties (i) - (iv) characterizes the steady state of the model 
presented in Section 2, except in the limiting case when the speculative 
demand for foreign exchange fornard is perfectly elastic. 11 
1\'c adopt the savings function (3. 2) and ass tune, for simpiici ty and 
-
without e~sential loss of ~enerality, that His exogenous and independent 
cf the interest rate. The steady state of the model presented in Section 2 
. . . ·d 
is attained 1,hen E = P = A = M = B = 0. Imposing these conditions yields 
the equations 
-
H = - (3. 4, 
E 
-R = R* + F (3. 41 
M - - L(Y, R, - fi) (3.4< 
E 
-d
B = J (-F) (3. 4c 
-
E(Gd + Gm) - T +RA= O. (3.4E 
- - -d -
Given H, these five equations involve the 7 variables, !-.1, A, B , E, R, ~, T. 
we shall assume initially that the monetarv authorities peg M =Mand 
A= A, continu,usly adjusting T to balance t:1c budget. 
Thus M, A, along with R*, may be treated as exogenous parameters. 
Totally differentiating the system with respect to these variables we 
-
oLtain thl: fol lo;,·ing effects on the domestic interest rate R 
- -
12. 
dR A (3.53< 0 
dR M (3. St-- > 0 
dA Ell 




\,·here !::. - J '~l LR (~l + A) > 0. 
Thus a once-and-for-all increase in the domestic money supply reduces the 
steady-state ~ornestic interest rate, while an increase in the doQestic supply 
of bonds increases it. An increase in the foreign interest rate leads to a 
reduction in the fon-:ard premitL'1l, causing the domestic interest rate to rise by 
a less than proportional amollllt. In the limiting case v,·hen J 1 -+=, the response 
becomes proportional and in this extreme case changes in Mand A have no 
effect on R. Thus, unless speculators are risk neutral or perceive no 
exchange risk, the domestic interest rate is not totally determined by the 
mannerinterest rate abroad and responds to domestic asset supplies in the 
indicated. 
-
Multiplying (3, 53.) by !-1 ar,d (3. Sb) by A and SlL"'7l:::ing yields an 
expression equal to zero. Thus an increase in the do~estic money supply 
accompanied by a proportioilal increase in the domestic bond supply is 
neutral in its effect on the steady-state domestic interest rate. 
Changes in Mand A have the following proportional effects on the 
steady-state ~pot rate E 




= { > 0 (3. 6 
dA E < 1 
- -
Both elJsticities are positive and less than one, \,hile surr;;ning to 
unity. Tnus, contrary to propositions (iii) and (iv), an increase in the 
money supply leads to a less than proportional increase in the exchange 
rate, while the supply of domestic bonds also affects the exchange rate. 
Proportional increases in the supplies of the two nominal assets together le
ads t 
proportional increases in the exchange rate and the domestic price level. 
As J•~, (3.6a) tends to unity and (3.6b) tends to zero. Thus only in 
this limiting case do propositions (iii) and (iv) hold. 
Fiscal policy involves changing A. A well-knmm proposition of 
~hmdell (1963) and Fleming (1962) is that under flexible rates and perfect 
capital nobility fiscal policy has no effect on the steady state of a small 
open econo::-,y. It is evident from our analysis that again for this result 
to apply, perfect capital mobility must be interpreted to mean that UIP 
obtains; i.e. thatforeign exchange speculation requires no risk premilL~. 
The same general characteristics of the steady state described by 
(3. 4a) - (3. 4e) obtain under alternative policy specifications. If, for 
exampie, tax receipts are held at a constant real level, say , , and the 
governr.1ent finances its deficit with bonds, the steady-state relations 
(3.4a) - (3.4e) will continue to dcter~ine the steady-state values of 
-d, ~, F- E- , and;:·,. ~ow, however, (3.4e) requires the stock of docestic 
bonds to adjust in proportion to the exchange rate, since T = E~. Under 
B f\. ·, 
UIP propositions (i) and (iv) still obtain but if UIP does not hold these 
propositi8ns will be violated as before. The responses of Rand E to 
-
changes in R* and M can be calculated (A is now endogenous) and will general
ly 
differ from the expressions given in (3.5), (3.6) above because of the 
difference in policy specification. 
\\'c conclude this discussion \,·ith a further cor:unent on (3.Sc), which 
leads to a fall in the for.-:ard prcr.1ium,asse:rts that an incrcJse in R* 
thereby leading to a less than proportionate rise in the domestic interest ra
te. 
This result tur.1s out to depend upon the specification of the savings 
14. 
function and under an alternative specification the domestic interest 
rate may actually increase r:o:re than proportionately. To illustrate this, 
suppose that instead of specifying a savings function as we have done, 
we specify a net e:x-port function 
X = X(E/P) X' > 0. 
Tne steady state of the system now consists of (3.4a) - (3.4e), together 
with the steady state of (2. 9) 





Since in steady st:ite E = P, \ is no,, fixed. H is no~,· endogenous 
and, giYen -~ and M, is determined together with B
-d
, E, R, F, and f. 
Consider an increase in R*. Since in steady state X - Gm is 
inde:rendent of R* it fol loKs from (3. 4f) that in order for the balance cf 
-d
payments on current account to remain in equilibrium, Bd must fall. If B 
falls, fon,ard market equilibrium condition (3.4d) requires the fon·ard 
prer.::iun to rise, in which case the CIP condition (3.4b) implies arr.ore than 
proportionate increase in the domestic interest rate. 
4. EXCHA.\GE RA.TE DY.\AMICS: PROPORTIO~AL I~CREASES I!\ HO;\EY A..f\D 
DO~~STIC BO~D SUPPLIES 
\\'e now consider an economy in Khich steady state is disturbed by 
once-and-fo:--all increases in the money supply and doI'.lestic bond supply 
of equal proportion and exasine the behaviour of the exchange rate 
during its transition to the new steady state. For convenience,we assume 
a log-linear version of the model developed in Section 2. Other simplifications 
are introduced not only to expedite thedynamic analysis, but also to make 
our results as co~parable as possible with the existing literature. 
Following, for example, Driskill (1980), we take the following 
lot-linear approximation to ~calth 
h = µ a + µ (e+bd) + (1-µ -µ )m - c =_ w-c (4. 1J
1 2 1 2 
where .., 1 is
 the share of domestic bonds in domestic wealth and 1,1 is the2 
15. 
-
share of foreign bonds. We denoter= R - R,0 
f = F - Fo.
and for all 
_ Q.n X - tn X , where for any variable Z denotesother variables let x 00 
the value of Zin the initial steady state. Thus xis the percentage 
deviation in X from its initial steady state val~e. 
Assuming that the foreign interest rate remains unchanged at R*, the 
interest rate parity condition (expressed in deviation form) is 
(4. 2)r = f 
while the price index now becomes 
(4. 3)c =op+ (1-o)e. 
Follm,·jng Dornbusch (1976), Gray and Turnovsky (197Sa) and \'iilson 
(1979) i--e r:-.ake the assllii1ption that income remains constant, an asst.:mption 
that has been shoh-n to be of some importance for exchange rate dy.iar.ii cs. 
Thus an approximation to money market equilibrium is given by 
m - c = -a r +ah Cl. > 0 (4. 4)1 . 2 l. = 
Imposing the assumption of perfect foresight, the log-linear 
approximation to the condition for forward market equilibrium becomes 
d (4. 5)e + b - c = y(e - f) y ; 0 
\•;here y is t:-ie elasticity of speculative demand for foreign exchange forward 
with resp2ct to the risk pre,1ium. y varies inverselv h·ith the degree of risk 
aversion with y ➔ as risk neutrality is approached. The adjustment of00 
prices is specified by l2 
p = 8(e - p) e > o. (4, 6) 
f..s disc.c.1ssed in Section 2, under the more general assumptions \-.:e 
make about speculative behaviour the dynamics of exchange rates and 
domestic prices are interdependent with those of assets. In order to keep 
the analysis tractable, the simplest possible assumptions "ill be made hith 
respect to the dy-namics of asset accumulation, First, we assume that the 
fiscal authority adjusts government expenditure and taxes to ensure that 3 
16. 
balanced budget obtains continuously. Thus, except at the moment when 
the monetary disturbance is introduced, A = ii = 0. Second, \,e assume that 
individuals adjust their holdings of foreign bonds toi-.·ards their steady-
state level, i.e. 
·d d -b = -pb = p(B - B) p > 0. (4. 7) 
0 
The forms of X(.) and S(.) implied by (4.7) may be derived from (2.9) 
and (2 .12) above. Portfolio adjustment costs may provide some justification 
for the accumulation equation (4.7). But the main advantage cf this formulaticr. 
for our purposes is its tractability; together ~ith the balanced budget 
assu~ption it r.iinirnizes the role of asset accu~ulation dyn~~ic:s, thus 
sir.ipl i fying our analysis enorri:iously. 
Equations (4.1) to (4,7) constitute a conplete dyna-nic system. 
Equations (4.1) through (4.4) determine at any moment values of h, c, r, 
and f as functions of e, p, and ba, \\hose dynamic behaviour is described 
by equations (4.5) through (4,7). 
For the special case in Khich a = 0 (zero wealth effects in the
2 
demand for money) and y ➔ ro (currency speculation requires no risk premium) 
the model outlined in equations (4.1) to (4.7) reduces in essence to the 
one examined by Dornbusch (1976) et al. As we ncntioned in Section 2, 
00w}1en y ➔ , exchange rate dynar.1ics are independent of Bd and A. For this 
re2.son these earlier studies did not require any assmr.ptions about the 
bond-fi:?anc:ed co;:;po:1ent of the government deficit or about ?avings behaviour. 
Dornbusch et al. consider the effects of a once-and-for-al 1 change 
1n the money supply on the path of the exchange rate and price level, As 
we pointed out :i.n Section 3, in the special case they consider the stead:.J­
state effect of such a change is a proportional change in the exchange rate 
and the price level, Kith the domestic interest rate remaininE unchanged, To 
□ aintain this lo~g-run neutrality in our more general rnodel 1 ~he change in 
the 1i1,mcy supply must be accc,rnpanied by a proportional change in the supply of 
17. 
domestic bonds. This policy is a once and for all transfer of money and 
bonds an~ is considered in this section. 
Consider an initial steady state in which all variables in 
equations (4.1) through (4. 7) are zero (i.e. £n X = tn X 0 , etc.) and ass
ume 
that the supplies of money and domestic bonds are both increased once-and-
for-all by~ per cent. 13 In the new steady state, e = p =~=;,while 
all other variables return to their initial (zero) levels. In particular, 
-d .
it is important to note that b = 0, i.e.,there is no change in the n~~ber 




d = 0 throughout the transition, so that this equation can be ignored. 1
4 
Thus, given the assu:::1ptions \~e have ;:iade, the dynamics can be :reduced 
to a consideration of~ and~­ Rearranging (4.5) and recalling (4.6) 
we may \\Ti te 
e = f + o(e - p) (4 .s 
y 
p = 8(e - p) (4. 6 
and using equations (4.1) through (4.4) to solve for f, we obtain the 
follmiing second order system of differential equations in e and p 
(4. 8 
0 0 
- + - +al - y y 
-[1 - a2(1-~2)]n 
k -
al 
where rn defining h i-.·e have used the fact that da = dm = m. Letting 
~here c = n = m, ~e m2y write the non-homogeneous svstem (4.8) 1n hornofcneous 
form 
( 4. _. 
18. 
which has as its solution 
e(t) = m+ A exp(A t) + A exp(A t) (4.9
1 1 2 2 
A.-a A -a 
1 1 2 1
p(t) = m + A exp(A t) + A -- exp(.\ t) (4.9
l a 1 2 a 2
2 2 
where A1 , A2 , are
 the solutions to the characteristic equation of (4.8') 
(4.1 
From the definitions of a and a we observe
1 2 
1-a + a ·· 2 21--2 
a + a = > 0 (4 .1 
l 2 Ct 
1 
This condition ·,,ill certainiy be met if the 
v,eal th el2.stici ty of the der.1and for money does not exceed -:.:ni ty, a can di ticn 
that see~s reasonable to impose. Thus (4.11) implies that the system 
(4.8') :ias rJne neg2.tive and o::-le positive eigenvalue, .....-hich we shall identify 
as )_ < 0, A~> 0, respectively.
1 .,_ 
To corr:plete the solution requires the deterrd.nation of the arbitrary 
constants A , A2" First, we shali impose the requirement that the system
1 
converges to its steady state, i.e. 15 
lim e(t) = e; lim p(t) = p. 
t~ t~ 
For this to be so the coefficient of the unstable root A = 0. The other2 
constant is obtained from an initial condition. In keeping with the literature 
on exchange rate dynamics, \,e assurne that, 1,hile discontinuous junps in the 
exchange ra:e are possible, the price of nontraded goods is constrained to 
move cont inuo 1-sly. The fact that the exchange rate is deternined by vir-::ually 
continuous trading in an auction market while the prices of nontraded goods 
are determined mainly by a large nu;1ber of longer-term contracts makes this 
assumption plausible. 1hus, imposing the condition thal p sta::-t fror:: its 
initiai stc::.1dy state value of zero, i.e., that 
A -a 
1 1p(o) = + m = o,Al 
a2 




Substituting the values for A1 
, A
2 
into (4.9a), (4.9b), recalling 
that e = p = m, yields the following solutions for the exchange rate and 
price of nontraded goods 
(4.13. 
Consider noh· the value of the exchange rate ir.u11ediately after the increase 
in the r..oney and bond supplies at t = O. This value, denotC'd by e(o+) 
is giYen by 
( 4 .14 
It can be established from (4.10) thatthe smaller root Al satisfies 
so that e(o+) ~ e c= m) as a2 ~ 0 or,equivalently,as 
(4. 15 
The exchange rate overshoots or undershoots its new steady-
state value as e(o+) ~ mand (4.15) provides a simple criterion for 
deter,:-,ining 1,·hich of these two cases occurs. In the limiting case of the 
Dornbusch nodel, a,= 0, y ensuring that overshooting takes place.➔ 00 ' 
Nore generally, a reduction in the wealth elasticity of the demand for 
money or an increase in the elasticity of speculation y raises the likelihoocu2 
of overshootingffc furthermore, differentiating e(o+) with respect toy 
O; an increase in the elasticityin~icatcs that as long as < l, de(o+)/dy >a2 
of specuJ2tion raises the impact effect on the exchange rate of a change in 
nominal asset supplies. 
20. 
The phenomenon of overshooting has been cited as a reason for the 
changes in asset supplies createobserved volatility of exchange r~tes; 
movements in exchange rates \,·hich exaggerate the implications of these 
changes for steady state. According to this interpretation, speculation 
As risk aversion on theacts to destabilize the foreign exchange market. 
part of speculators falls, making the supply of speculative funds more 
elastic, the exchange rate reacts more sharply to changes in asset 
' .,
supplies. • · 
To understand this result observe that since the prices of nontraded 
goods are sticky, changes in nominal asset supplies constitute, on impact, 
changes in real asset supplies. The exchange rate and interest rate must 
adjust to' restore asset market equilibrium. An increase in the nominal 
supplies of money and domestic bonds increase both the supply of and 
denand for r.ioney, the second via a ,,·cal th effect. Taking the likely case 
1, the net impact on the money market is to create an excess supply.<a
2 
To maintain equilibrium in the money market during the adjustment period 
requires a lower domestic interest rate, \,·hich in turn requires a lo,\er 
fon,·ard pre;.1iurn on foreign exchange, f. 
~ben speculation is perfectly elastic, f = e. In this case, a 
lo,,·er d::i:;-1estic interest rate requires a continuous c;-;;y,ee:_::.-:::io,, (c < O) 
during t~e adjust~ent period. If the exchange rate is to appreciate to its 
ne1-:, higher, steady-state value it v.,ust initially depreciate to a value 
< 
c._:),:;ve e; that is, the exchange rate must overshoot. 
00 ), however,ll°he:r. speculation is less than perfectly elastic, (y 
an exch;mg2 rate depreciation also impinges on fon,·ard market equilibrium by
 
This revaluation creates anre\'aluing domestic holdings of foreign bonds. 
excess sup11ly of foreign exchange fon,ard 1,hich acts to bid <lm~11 the fonvar<l
 
If the drop in f rc::..1ired to restorepre:r:1ium on foreign exchange f. 
forward w.arket equilibrium exceeds the drop required to restore money 
market equilibrium, then a continuous depreciatior. (e > 0) is needed to 
maintain equi 1ibriwn in both markets. For this continuous depreciation 
to converge to the new steadi state exchange rate, the depreciation on 
impact must be 1ess than the ste:1dy state depreciation; that is, undershooting 
of the exchange rate must occur. 
S. EXCHA\GE RATE DY~A,\lICS: INCREASE IN J-K)NEY SUPPLY ALO:(E 
In section 4 1s·e analyzed a change in nominal asset supplies wh.;.ch 
was neutral in the sense that it generated proportional changes in the 
steady-state do;.1estic price level and exchange rate \dth no change in the 
steady-state domestic interest rate. Using the model of Section 4, consider 
r.ci, a once-and-for-all change in the money supply alone of iii per cent. 
Starting from initial zero levels, the effects on the steady-state 
exchange r2.te, price level, and fon,·ard premium are given by 
< rn (5 .1, 
(S .11 
respectjvely, while do~estic holdings of foreign bonds change by 
-d 
b = > 0 (5. 1c 
Thus an increase in the money supply leads to a less than proportional 
increase in the exchange rate, accompanied by a reduction ir. the forward 
premium, 1,·hi le the number of foreign bonds held in steady state increases. 
The economy Gust therefore on average run a current account surplus during 
the transi:'.~n betw~e~ steady states. The reason is that the increase in 
the noncy "- ·]v raises the price level. The real value of outstanding 
do:::cstic DC;:_ 3 reduced and a larger number of foreign bonds are required 
to mainta5n real wealth at H. 




0 0 -p 
~here a 1 and
 a
2 
are defined as before, 
-d
~~ote th2t because b is disturbed by the policy, the dynar,,ics of :foreign 
bond accu~ulation nust no~ be taken into account. 
Solving (5.2) along ~ith the terminal condition 
lirn e(t) = e = lirn p(t) = p 
t-+= 
and the i;-ii tial conditions 
p(o) = 0, 
vields 
(\ -a 'i 
I ]






t) - (5.: 
cl 2 j 
(5.: 
hhcrc ] ;:md />.2 a-,,,. as defined in Section 1 andI 
I -~ 
-da_b G a2 
- I r ) , C - . -Al . r+. I r,+t ) rl ). 1 - al\' 1, ' 2 
Substituting forA1 ,p, 
~ and b~d
 into (S.Sa) at time t = 0, the 
criterion for the initial overshooting or undersh00ting of the exchange 
rate is given by the expression 
(5. 6) 
This is a rather complicated function of the underlying parameters and i· 
does not appear that the phenomenon can be characterized by any simple 
conditicn. Thus,during the transition between steady states the economy 
runs a current acco1:nt s:;.,2r;::-us, while either e > 0 or e < 0 is possible. 
Any relationship between the direction of the movement of the exchange rate 
and the current account may therefore exist. 
6. CO\CLUSIO:: 
The assUTJption that speculative foreign exchange positions require 
a risk premiur:1 has iGplications for a number of propositions about open 
economies \,·i th flexible exchange rates. In particular, propositions about 
the impotence of fiscal policy and the equality in steady state between 
domestjc and foreign interest rates based on the assumption of perfect capital 
mobility require the strong version of this assumption -- uncovered interest 
rate pari t:: -- to h0ld. They do not obtain if only the \,·cakcr assur::ption 
of covered interest rate parity holds. 
Furthermore, introducing risk aversion along hi th 
wealth effec:s in the demand f6r money has imclications for 
exchange rate dynamics. It tends to reduce the presumption of overshooting 
of the exchange rate in response to monetary disturbances, both the likelihood 
that it happens at all &nd the 3mo~nt by which it occurs if it does occur. 
To the extent that the major sources of disturbances are changes in nominal 
asset suppl1es, factors encouraging currency speculation, such as an increase 
in the n1mber of speculators, arc likely to reduce the overall risk aversion 
exhibited hy the market and increase the volatility of the exchange rates. 
In tl1is sense spccul~tors destabilize the raarkct. 
ruu1.,vlc.::> 
1. Other authors draw the distinction between perfect capital mobility
bet\,een cotmt ries and perfect subs ti tutabi Ii ty between dornesti c and
foreign bonds. The forwer term corresponds to the weaker definition
of CIP, hhile the latter describes the stronger definition of UIP:
see Fran~:el (1981). 
2. Steady states possessing varying degrees of stationarity are familiar
from the literature; see, e.g., Dornbusch (1976), Turnovsky (1977). 
3. This provosition is of course based on the presur-,ption that the h'Orld
is not characteri:ed by conditions of secular inflation, an ~ssu~ption
r.iade thro:1ghout this a.nalys is. Under secularly inflationary conditions,
the steady-state relationship between the domestic and foreign interest
rates under UI? is R = R* + e, hhere e is the secular rate of inflation.
It is clear that through e domestic policies =re able to influence the
domestic nominal rate of interest even if UIP obtains. 
4. This r;.>sult has also been obtained by Harris and Purvis (1979). 
5. ;f\.' st::css that this state::-,ent refers to ::-,odels based on sir:iilar assuni:;-,:ic ~s
to those ~e stall introduce. A good deal of attention has been de¥ot~d
in the j :i tcn;.ture to establishing the robustness of the 01:ershooting
phenor::enon ;1nd r:any r.iodels in i-·hi ch it does not occur TIO\, exist. Factor .3
tending to elir.iinate o\·ershooting, but ;~ot incorporated in our analysis
include: (i) variaoie output, (i 1.) instantaneous price adj ustr:ient,
(iii) sufficiently 101, substitutability beh;een domestic and foreign
securities. 
6. 1·;e find it analytically convenient to separate fonsard market participation
into pure speculation and pure arbitrage. We implicitly treat the
acquisition of an amo:..i:1t of :;,;::~:r.:eY'2c. foreign bonds as cor::;,inir:g a co:;erec.
investr;ier.t of x in foreign bonJ.s and a specu:c:t-:ve pc~r>e:r:a.se of foreign
curre:::c:y for,,·ard in a;r.cunt x. In a portfolio r:-,odel of foreign investment we
identify a third r.10tive for participating in 1the fon,ard market as hedging
against dorr:estic inflation. Fon,ard positions for hedging purposes depend
upon the relative variability of the domestic and foreign price levels and
do not respc,nd to the Y3riablcs we are concerned 1-:i th here. Thus 1,e may
treat the forward position due to hedging as a constant absorbed in Jt;
see Eaton ar.d Tumovs~:y (1980;. 
1. The notiCJ:: of a ''risk premiurr:" on fon,ard exchange in a non-stochastic
r,odc l is so;:;n:hat a1d~h·ard, al though no more so than having different rates
of re:tur;1 C'n c!iffercnt securities as is cor:::.:onplacc in con-ventional deterministic
r;iacrocco,.o;;.ics. Our r.:ain reason for doing this is to preserve analytical
t ractabi l i t.y and also to enable us to preserve comparabi 1 i ty 1..-i th the
£,.xistin,.: literature-, 1-.-hich is also deterministic. One inter;irct2.tion of
o:..ir apnro2.ch ;,: t" ~ :,11~_1: ,.•.·;:ectations :o.:-c (•c. :',\";::-~:,;t:· ,~:-,-~ i: 1:,~. '"~·,:C'rtheless
tt:c r~<.'..;:···n.: ---;-,.: :-::.:!~·-_:-:.:--:- :·: ::::~, th'2 r1c=s:nitl1:l~.' 0~ ·.. ~~ct·~·.- ill effect the










To see this, observe that \,ith bond financing the d)T1ar:1ics of E, P involve: 
only equations (2.4), (1.3), (2.S) and (2. 7). With a money-financed deficit 
equation (2.8), \,·jth A= 0, r.i:.ist be considered as well. The fact that bond 
accumulation may continue j11 steady state in the absence of wealth effects 
in relevant demand ftmctions is familiar from the simple IS-LM model; see 
e.g. Turnovsky (1977, Chapter 4). 
Another policy worth notinr, is the balanced budget. As long as H enters 
the money der:and function, steady state always requires g = b = O; 
irrespective of the elasticity of the speculative derr:and for fon,·ard 
exchange ~ith respect to the risk premium. The same applies if Lis 
independent of H, as long as J' is finite. The limiting case of infinitely 
elastic speculation, steady state requires only that g = 0. 
This type of specification is used, for example, by Tobin a."1d Buiter (1976) 
for a closed economy. 
Even in this li~iting case, propositions (iii) and (iv) do not nece~~ar~ly 
hold under altcrnati ve, plausible specifications of asset supply and a~ set 
accu::1;..ilation beha\·ior. Con.sider the case in \,·hich taxes are ;,,aintaine( at 
a constant le·;el in re:1i tems. If the govern:ient deficit is c..:.;.,::.::-fin·.nced 
and if c:he: cc·:::and for ;;-,ency is ir.dependent c,f H pTOpositions (iii) and (iv) 
do still hold. Ho1s·ever, if the deficit is mone2-financed an increase in 
the stock cf dor:iestic bonds ca~ses a proportionate change in E, which 
through the deficit leads to an eventual proportionate change in M. This 
contradicts proposition (iv), ~hile the causality of (iii) is reversed. 
\\"i th a bal &.need budget the exchange rate is homogeneous of degree one in 
money c::,;,:5. dor:iestic bonds. 
This specification deviates slightly from that adopted by Dornbusch et al, 
in \•;hich prices are assu.,-;ied to adjust in proportion to excess demand, as 
a :result of which the dor:1estic interest rate appears in (4.6) as well. 
Ke have chosen our specification not only for reasons of its simplicity, 
but also because it follm..-s directly from a model based on long-term 
contracts. 
In interpreting this initial steady-state in which all variables equal 
zero it should be recalled that all variables are measured in deviation 
form. 
According to our assunption about asset accu~ulation, then, a change 
~hich has only no~inal effects on the steady state has no effect on the 
balance of payncnts on current account during the transition. \•,'hile an 
alternative specification of savings behaviour could allo~ a non-zero 
curre~t account balance at any noment during the tr2nsition, the integral 
of the current accou:-1t balance betheen th'O such steady states r.n;st equal 
zero. Fer instance, if the impact of debt expansic•n is to create a deficit, 
the current account balance nust at some later stage be in su1~Zus before 
the ne~ steady state is reached. 
Convergence r.ay follo,, by appealinr. to transvers2.lity conditions from 
appropriate optimi:jng □ odels which, provided that the underlying utility 
function satisfies suitable restrictions, ensure that price movements 
remain bounded. 
Allen and ~cncn (19SOJ also find that introducing wealth cff~cts 1n the 
money JC'::-,0.nc.1 function c;.m reduce or reverse overshooting. Thci r model Ji f;c:Ts 
sub~tantially from 0urs, ho~cvcr, especially in that it docs not assume 
pc:rfi:.-c.:t fc:·c.:"ight. 
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